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Methods for approximating the system hazard function are
developed for systems which have constant component failure
rates. The approximations are applicable to systems which
are "highly reliable," e.g., all component reliabilities
greater than 0.9 and system reliability greater than 0.95.
Three approximations are developed. The first-order ap-
proximation is based on the system cuts of least size
(smallest cuts). The fix-up approximation is based on the
minimal cuts of the system and is an extension of the methods
used in NAVWEPS OD 29304. The second-order approximation is
a more accurate extension of the first-order approximation.
The advantages peculiar to each of these approximations
are:
(1) first-order: easy to calculate,
(2) fix-up: never leads to an overestimate of system
reliability,
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis deals with probabilistic approximations for
system reliability as opposed to statistical estimators of
component or system failure rates. The problem addressed
herein is that of approximating the probability of failure as
a function of time for a system whose components have known
(or estimated) constant failure rates.
It has been shown [1] that a system of constant failure
rate components will not have a constant system failure rate
unless all components are in series. When all components are
in series the system failure rate is the sum of the component
failure rates, a simple calculation requiring no approxima-
tions. When all components are not in series the system fail-
ure rate is a function of time; usually it is a rather
complicated function. In the latter case simple approxima-
tions have great practical usefulness.
The function approximated in this thesis is the system
hazard function. The hazard function is a very convenient
device when a system consists of a series of subsystems, and
some of the subsystems have components in parallel. The sys-
tem hazard function is simply the sum of the subsystem
hazard functions, and the system reliability is the exponen-
tial of the negative of the system hazard function. The only
difficulty in determining system reliability, then, is deter-
mining the hazard function for those subsystems which do not

have all components in series. It is to this end that simple
approximate methods for determining the hazard function are
developed in this paper.
The system hazard function can be formulated as a function
of the component failure rates and of time (mission length)
.
Bounds on the value of the hazard function for any mission
length are developed in [2] . The approximations developed
in this paper are useful for systems of variable mission
length, however, the accuracy of the approximations is gener-
ally acceptable only in the range of mission lengths for
which system reliability is "high" (e.g., component reliabil-
ities at least 0.9 and system reliability at least 0.95).
Three methods of approximating the system hazard function




The first-order approximation has the form a (At)*3 when compo-
nent failure rates are all equal. When component failure
rates are not all equal the first-order approximation has the
form £n(X.t). The fix-up and the second-order approximations
are made up of terms of the same form as the first-order
approximation. The fix-up approximation is an extension of
the methods used in [3] . When the methods of [3] can be




None of these approximations requires the complete compu-
tation of the system reliability function. This is of
definite practical advantage in complex systems.

II. DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES
A convenient vehicle for illustrating definitions is
the 2-out-of-3 system. A 2-out-of-3 system consists of
three components: it functions if any two components func-
tion or all three components function. If less than two
components function, the system fails.
A. SYSTEM STRUCTURE
All components and systems are considered to be two-state
devices in the sense that they either "function" or "fail."
We use the symbol x. to represent the state of the i-th
component:
x. = if the i-th component fails,
=1 if the i-th component functions.
1 . Condition Vector
In a system consisting of n components the vector
x = (x, , . . . ,x ) represents the state of all the components
in the system. We say x describes the "condition" of the sys-
tem. Superscripts are used to distinguish different conditions
of the system, e.g., x , x"6 .
The possible conditions of a 2-out-of-3 system are
shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Conditions of a 2-out-of-3 System.
2 . Structure Function
The structure function 4>(x) indicates the state of
the system (function or fail) when it is in the condition
described by x:
<{>(x) =0 if the system fails in condition x,
=1 if the system functions in condition x.
Considering the conditions of a 2-out-of-3 system
shown in Fig. 1, we see for example that:
<{>(x ) = (only component No. 3 functions; system fails),




The approximations developed in this thesis are closely
related to those conditions of the system in which it fails.
We define a cut as any condition in which the system fails,
i.e., condition x is a cut if cf>(x)=0.
The 2-out-of-3 system has four cuts: x -(0,0,0),
x
2
=(0,0,l), x 3 =(0,l,0) and x 4 =(l,0,0). The system fails if it




Cut Size and System Width
The size of a cut x, s(x) , is defined as the number
of failed components in the condition described by x. For
example, in Fig. 1 the size of x -(0,0,0) is s(x 1 ) = 3, and
the size of x 2=(0,0,l) is s(x 2 ) = 2.
The width of the system, m, is defined as the smallest
size of any cut, i.e., the least number of failed components
that can cause the system to fail. In a 2-out-of-3 system at
least two components must fail in order that the system fails,
so the system width is m = 2.
5 Failed Component Set
For any condition x the failed component set 0(x) is
defined as the set of indices of the components that are
failed when the system is in the condition described by x.
g
6. Minimal Cut
In Fi . 1, 0(x 4 ) = {2,3} and 0(x 5 ) = {1}.
The concept of a "minimal" cut is important in the
approximations developed in this paper. A cut x is a minimal
cut if it has the following property: the "repair" of any
failed component in the cut causes the system to function. In
the 2-out-of-3 system the conditions x 2 , x^ and x are minimal
cuts; x-*- is not a minimal cut. In general, a cut x is said
to "contain" a cut xB if (x ) is a proper subset of (x )
.
Consequently, a minimal cut contains no other cuts. In Fig.
1, 0(x 2 ) = {1,2} is a proper subset of OU 1 ) = {1,2,3}; x 2 is
a cut, therefore, x-*- is not a minimal cut. Note that if the
size of a cut equals the system width, then the cut is
minimal.

7. Sets of Cuts
We define K as the set of all cuts of the system and
K as the set of all cuts of size s. C is defined as the
s s
number of cuts of size s. For the 2-out-of-3 system we have:
r 1 2 3 4iK = Ix ,x ,x ,x }
K = the empty set C. =
K
2
= {x 2 ,x 3 ,x 4 } C
2
= 3
K = (x 1 ) C-. = 1.
3 »
B. PROBABILISTIC RELIABILITY FUNCTIONS
So far the probabilistic and time dependent characteristics
of the component and system states have been suppressed. It is
assumed, however, that only probabilistic statements can be
made about the state of the components and the system, and
that these statements have time as an independent variable.
A system consisting of two components in series provides a
convenient example for illustrating the definitions of this
section. Such a system functions only if both components
function; if either component or both components fail, then
the system fails.
1 . Reliability Function
In the example of a two-component series system an
important question is, "Will component No. 1 still be func-
tioning at time t?" The state of component No. 1, x-^, is
considered a probabilistic function of time, i.e., x = X (t)
,
a random variable. So a more meaningful form of the above
question is, "What is the probability x-,^1 at time t?" The
10

answer to this question is called the component reliability
function, F (t)
.
In general, for any i-th component the component reli-
ability function F. (t) is defined as






The form of the component reliability function depends
on the reliability characteristics of the component. In the
two-component series system example the "exponential lifetime"








(t) = e 2
where X and X are positive constants.
1 2
Turning our attention to the system we might ask, "What
is the probability that the system is still functioning at
time t?" The answer to this question is called the system
reliability function F(t), i.e.,
F(t) E Pr (system is functioning at time t)
.
In the two-component series system the system reli-
ability function is
F(t) = Pr (both components are functioning at time t)




-X t -X t1-2





2 . System Reliability in Terms of Cuts
There are various methods for computing system reli-
ability. The following method, although it appears rather
cumbersome, proves useful in developing hazard function
approximations
.
For any condition of the system, x, define p(x) as
the probability that the system is in condition x at time t.
It is assumed that the failure times of the components in the
system are independent random variables. Consequently, p(x)
equals the product of the probabilities that each component
is in the state described by condition x.
The four possible conditions of a two-component series
system are shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 2. Conditions of a Two-Component Series System.
In condition x 2 the component states are x-,=0 (No. 1
component has failed) and X2=l (No. 2 component is functioning)
So, p(x 2 ) = Pr(No. 1 comp. has failed and No. 2 comp. is
functioning)
.
= Pr(No. 1 comp. has failed) Pr(No. 2 comp. is
functioning.
But, Pr(No. 1 comp. has failed) = 1 - Pr(No. 1 comp. is
functioning)
= 1 - F (t)
-At






Also, Pr(No. 2 comp. is functioning) = e
-At -X,t
Thus, p(x) = (1-e X )e .
The probability that the system has failed equals
the probability that it is in a condition which is a cut.
The conditions of a system are mutually exclusive (if the sys-
tem is in condition xA it is not in any other condition xB )
.
Consequently, we can sum the probabilities of the conditions
that are cuts to get the probability that the system has
failed.
The two-component series system has three conditions
which are cuts, i.e.,
K = {x1 #x2 #x3 }.
The probability this system has failed is the sum over the
conditions in K of the probabilities of being in those
conditions, i.e.,
Pr(system has failed) = £ p(x)
xeK
= p(x X ) + p(x 2 ) + p(x 3 )
.





we have: pCx 1 ) = (1-e ) (1-e )
„ -X t -At
p(x 2 ) = (1-e x )e z
-At -At




Pr (system has failed) = 1 - e l
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Thus, F(t) = Pr (system is functioning)
= 1 - Pr (system has failed)
-(X +X )t
= e *
The foregoing method of calculating system reliability
in terms of cuts has three significant characteristics:
(1) It can be used for any system.
(2) It requires only a knowledge of the conditions
which are cuts.
(3) Cuts which have relatively small probability can
be ignored in order to simplify the calculation
of approximate system reliability.
3 . Hazard Function
For the i-th component the component hazard function
R. (t) is defined by




The system hazard function R(t) is similarly defined
R(t) E -log F(t)
.














R(t) = -log e z (X 1+X 2 )t.
Note that in this series system the system hazard function
is the sum of the component hazard functions, i.e.,





The hazard function is very convenient to use when
dealing with systems which can be represented as a series of
subsystems. Each subsystem hazard function can be calculated
or approximated, and the system hazard function is then simply
the sum of the subsystem hazard functions. The system reli-
ability is the negative exponential of the system hazard
function, i.e., F(t) = e" R(t) .
4 . Failure Rate
For the i-th component the component failure rate
r. (t) is defined by
r.
(t)
= d_ R. (t)
.
1 dt
The system failure rate r(t) is similarly defined by
r(t) E d_ R(t)
.
dt
(These definitions agree with the classical definition of
failure rate in terms of the probability density function and
the reliability function.)
In the two-component series system we have
r, (t) = d R (t) = d_ X t = X ,
x dt x dt L l
r (t) = d_ R? (t) = d_X t = X ,z dt dt x x
r(t) = d_ R(t) = d_(X +X )t = X + X .
dt dt L l Z
Note that the component failure rates, X, and X , are con-
stant. An exponential lifetime (F^(t)=e ) is equivalent
to a constant failure rate (r.(t)=X.).
In the systems considered in this thesis all compo-




The problem to be dealt with here is that of determining
the hazard function for a large system in which all compo-
nents have constant failure rates. It is assumed that the
large system consists of a series of subsystems. Those sub-
systems which consist of a single component or a series of
components may be treated separately; the hazard function for
this group is simply the sum of the component hazard functions.
An exact formulation of the hazard function for the more com-
plex subsystems is often difficult. The approximations
developed in this section provide a relatively simple method
for approximating the hazard function for these complex
subsystems.
(The "systems" referred to in this section should be con-
sidered as subsystems within a larger system. These "systems"
always have more than one component and are more complex than
a simple series of components.)
Initially, consider first-order approximations for sys-
tems in which all failure rates are equal to some constant
X(>0). Once the method is illustrated in this special case,
the generalization to systems in which component failure rates
are not all equal is rather straightforward.
The following example shows a direct technique for deriv-
ing a first-order approximation to the hazard function.
16

Example 3-1. Consider a system consisting of three com-
ponents each having constant failure rate X . The system
functions if and only if two or more of its components func-
tion (2-out-of-3 system)
.
The component reliability functions are
F. (t) = e"Xt i = 1,2,3.
The system reliability function is
F(t) = 3e ^At - 2e
Expand the exponentials in the system reliability function
-v 2 "*
using e = 1 - x + x_ - x_j_ + . . . .
2! 3!
We then have
F(t) = 3(1 - 2,\t + 4(Xt) 2 - 8(Xt) 3 + ...)
2! 31
-2(1 - 3xt + 9(Xt) 2 - 27(Xt) 3 + . . .)
2! 3!
= 1 -3(Xt) 2 + 5(Xt) 3 + . . . .
We can now derive the hazard function
R(t) = -log F(t)
by using the expansion of the logarithm function about 1:
-log(l-x) = x - x£ + x_^ - ... .
2 3
Thus, R(t) = -log(l - 3(Xt) 2 + 5(Xt) 3 - ...)
= 3(Xt) 2 - 5(Xt) 3 + . . . .
The first-order approximation, then, is
R 1 (t) = 3(Xt) 2 .
The direct method has two drawbacks. First, an explicit
formulation of the system reliability function is required.
Second, the exponentials must be expanded and the coeffi-
cients of the various powers of Xt must be collected.
17

The indirect method of determining the first-order approxi-
mation for the hazard function is based on the following line
of reasoning:
(1) Recall that K is the set of all cuts of the system,
and that the elements of K are mutually exclusive. Also, be-
cause of the assumption that component lifetimes are indepen-
dent, the probability that the system is in the condition
described by a cut equals the product of the probabilities
that each component is in the state described by the cut.
(2) The reliability function can be formulated as
Pr (system is functioning) = 1 - Pr (system has failed)
= 1 - £ Pr (system in condition x)
xeK
(3) For any cut x of size s (size = no. failed comp.)
,
p(x) = Pr (system in condition x)
= (e~Xt ) n_s (l-e~Xt ) s .
Consider the value of p(x) for small values of t,
lim p(x) = lim (e"x
t
)
n " s /l-e"x
t
\ s ts_r (r<s)
.
t+0 t+0 \ t J









s — rlim t = if r<s,
t+0
=1 if r=s.
Thus, when x is a cut of size s,





= A for r=s.

For small values of t we have the approximation
p(x) = (Xt) s .
(4) Recall C is the number of cuts of size s, and m is
s
the smallest value of s such that C >0. (m = system width.)
s
F(t) = Pr (system is functioning)
=1-1 P(x)
xeK
= i - y c (xt) s
s
s=m
= 1 - C (Xt) m .
m
(5) The first-order approximation for the system hazard
function is derived from the foregoing approximation for the
system reliability function.
R(t) = -log F(t)
=
-log(l - C (Xt) m )
m
= C (Xt) m = R1 (t) where R1 (t) is the first-order
m
approximation for the system hazard function.
In summary, when all component failure rates are equal the
first-order approximation for the system hazard function can
be determined in three steps:
a. Determine the system width, m.
b. Determine the number of cuts of size m, C .
m
c. Calculate R1 (t) = C (Xt) m .
m
Example 3-2. Apply the foregoing method to the 2-out-of-3
system.
a. At least two components must fail for the system to




b. There are three cuts of size two. so C =3.
m
c. Consequently, R 1 (t) = C (Xt) m = 3 (At) 2 .
m
When the component failure rates are not all equal the
first-order approximation for the hazard function is derived
by the same line of reasoning used in (1) through (5) above.
The essential difference is in the form of p(x)
.
Let x be a cut of size s. Recall (x) E {i:x.=0}, and





p(x) = n e 1 n (1-e 1 ) .
i/0(x) ieO(x)
There are s elements in 0(x), so
. t / -X . t \
1
n (l-e Ip(x) = n e




and lim p (x) = r<s,
t->0 r
= n X i r=s.
ieO(x)
t
Thus, for small t, p(x) = t II \.
.
ieO (x)
The system reliability function is approximated by
F(t) = 1 - I p(x)
xeK
m
= i - I t
m
n x . .
xcK ieO(x) x
m












In summary, when the component failure rates are not all
equal the first-order approximation for the system hazard
function can be determined in three steps:
a. Determine the system width, m.
b. For each cut x in K calculate the product
m ^
n X . t = tm n X . .
ieO(x) x ieO(x) 1
c. The first-order approximation R (t) is the sum of
these products over all x in K
, i.e.,
m
Rx (t) = tm I n \ .
xeK ieO(x) 1
m
The following example illustrates the method.
Example 3-3. Consider a 2-out-of-3 system with component fail-
ure rates X
,


















{ x 2, x 3^ x 4 ]f and K ^ m {x !K
The width of the system is m = 2.




z X X t^
x
3














R^t) = tm I n X .
xeK ieO(x) 1
m













If the component failure rates had been equal. X, = X =
1 2
X = X , then the above answer would reduce to
R1 (t) = t 2 (3X 2 ) = 3(Xt) 2 .
The first-order approximation for the system hazard func-
tion contains three approximations:




1 - e x = X .t.
l
(2) Pr(system has failed) = \ p(x).
xeK
m
(3) -log (1-Pr (system has failed)) = Pr (system has failed).
Approximation (1) has an error of less than 5% when
X.t<_0.10. This corresponds to a component reliability of 0.9
or greater.
The error in approximation (2) is directly related to the
probability that the system fails due to a cut of size greater
than system width m. The accuracy of approximation (2) suffers
when relatively unreliable components are not in the failed
component set for any cut of size m. When system reliability
is greater than 0.95 the cuts of size m usually account for
enough of the probability of system failure to make approxima-
tion (2) acceptable.
Approximation (3) has an error of less than 5% when system
reliability is greater than 0.90.
22

As a rule of thumb we say that the first-order approxima-
tion for the system hazard function is usually acceptable when
all component reliabilities are greater than 0.9 and the sys-
tem reliability is greater than 0.95.
23

IV. FIX-UP AND SECOND-ORDER APPROXIMATIONS
In this section we develop methods for improving upon the
first-order approximation for the system hazard function.
The first method developed, the fix-up approximation, is not
always a more accurate approximation than the first-order
approximation, but it always errs on the "safe side." The
other method developed, the second-order approximation, is
always at least as accurate as the first-order approximation,
in most cases it is significantly more accurate.
A. THE FIX-UP APPROXIMATION
The first-order approximation of the system hazard function
may not be acceptable if comparatively "weak" components do not
appear in any of the cuts of size m (m = system width) . The
following example illustrates this situation and provides a
heuristic approach to the fix-up approximation.






Figure 3. Hydraulic Pump System - Physical Arrangement
24

The upper branch functions if No. 1 functions. The lower
branch functions if No. 2 functions and either No. 3 or No. 4
functions. The system functions if either the upper or lower
branch functions.






Figure 4. Hydraulic Pump System - Cut Representation.
The first-order approximation for the system hazard func-
1 2tion is R (t) = X X t . This completely ignores the failure
1 2.
rates of Nos. 3 and 4. If Nos . 3 and 4 are considerably less
reliable than Nos. 1 and 2, the accuracy of the first-order
approximation may not be acceptable. An obvious "fix-up"
would be to get a first-order approximation based on the cut
in which Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are failed, and add this to the pre-
vious approximation, i.e.,
RF (t) = R1 (t) + X,A,X „t 313 4
= XXt 2 + X X X t 3 .12 13 1
The "fix-up" approximation for the system hazard function,
pR (t) , shown in Example 4-1 is sometimes a simple method for
improving the accuracy of the first-order approximation. It
can be derived for any system in the following manner:
25

a. Identify all minimal cuts of the system.
b. For any minimal cut x, let s(x) = size of x.
c. Let K = {all minimal cuts}.
M
d. Then, RF (t) = £ t s (x) n \ ± .
xeK ieO(x)M
For illustration, apply these steps to Example 4-1:








b. s (x 1 ) = 2, and s (x 2 ) = 3.
c. K = {x^x 2 }.M




















= A-iA^t + A , A ~A ,. t •
The rationale behind the fix-up approximation can be sum-
marized in the following manner. We treat each minimal cut x
as if the system width were s (x) . We then calculate the
"contribution" of the minimal cut x to the first-order approxi-
mation for the system hazard function, ts ' x ' II X. . These
ie0(x) x
contributions are summed over all minimal cuts, and the result
is the fix-up approximation.
The fix-up approximation for the system hazard function is





Recall that all cuts of size m are minimal cuts, so K is
m
a subset of K . Consequently,
M
RF (t) = I t
s(x)
n x. > I t
m
n a. = R^t).
xeKm ieO(x)
1
xeK i£0(x) xM m
In view of these inequalities the fix-up approximation is
less accurate than the first-order approximation whenever the
first-order approximation is "pessimistic" i.e., whenever
R 1 (t) >R(t)
.
It is important to note that the fix-up approximation does
provide an upper bound on the system hazard function and,
therefore, it leads to a lower bound on system reliability.
If errors of "optimism" are to be avoided, the fix-up approxi-
mation has the virtue that any errors will be errors of
"pessimism.
"
The methods for approximating the system hazard function
shown in Ref. 3 give results which are equivalent to the fix-
up approximation. (Unfortunately, these methods cannot be
applied unambiguously to some systems, e.g., the 2-out-of-3
system.
)
B. THE SECOND-ORDER APPROXIMATION
When component failure rates are constant it is always




R(t) = T a o
j = J




shown in developing the first-order approximation that a . =
when j is less than the system width m. Consequently, the
power series expansion of R(t) can be written:
00
R(t) = T a.t^ .
j=m J
The first-order approximation was simply the first term
in the power series expansion of R(t), i.e.,
R X (t) = a tm
m




The second-order approximation for the system hazard func-
tion, R (t) , consists of the first two non-zero terms of the
power series expansion of R(t), i.e.,
R 2 (t) = a tm + a tm+1 .
m m+1
One method for calculating the second-order approximation
is the direct approach (see Example 3-1) . To illustrate this
method consider the system in Example 4-1.
The system reliability function is
-At -At -At -X t -X t - (X +X ) t
F(t) = e 1 +(l-e X )e 2 (e 3 +e 4 -e 3 4 ).
The direct approach consists of three steps:
a. Expand the exponentials in F(t) using
-v 2 ~\e=l-x + x_->r_+... .
2! 3!




c. Formulate the hazard function using
-log(l-x) = x - x_ + x_ -... .
2 3
Applying these steps to the system in Example 4-1 results in
the following power series expansion of the system hazard
function:
R(t) = X X t 2 + (X X X -IX X (X +X ))t 3 + (terms of order t 4 ) .12 1342 12 12
Consequently, the second-order approximation for the hazard
function of this system is





















Note that the second-order approximation in this example in-
cludes the first-order and the fix-up approximations, i.e.,
R 2 (t) = X X t 2 + X X X t 3 - 1X,X (X +X )t 312 134 j 1 2 1 2
= R1 (t) + X X X t 3 - 1X.X (X +X)t 31J4 2 J- £ L Z
= R
F (t) - IX X (X +X )t 3 .
2 1 I I 2.
The direct approach is a rather tedious method for calcu-
lating the second-order approximation. In this section we
develop a more efficient method. The development of this
method uses the following line of reasoning:
(1) We know that
R(t) = a tm + a ^t 1"11 + (terms of order tm+2 ) .
m m+1
Suppose F(t) could be expressed as a power series of the
form
F(t) = 1 - b tm - b ,tm+1 + (terms of order tm+2 )
.
m m+1









+ (terms of order tm+2 )
)
"i m+1
= b tm + b ^,tm+1 + (terms of order tm+2 )
.
m m+1
But, -log F(t) = R(t) , so corresponding terms of the power
series expansion must be equal, i.e.,




Consequently, we will have the desired second-order ap-
proximation for the system hazard function if we can express
F(t) in the form
F(t) = 1 - a tm - a +m+1 + (terms of order tm+2 )
.
m m+1
(2) We know that
F(t) = 1 - Pr(system has failed),
and Pr (system has failed) = \ p(x).
xeK
So we wculc hope that \ p(x) can be expressed in the form
xeK
7 p(x) = a tm + a tm+1 + (terms of order tm+2 )
,tv m m+1
Such an expression is possible if and only if for all cuts x
in K there exist functions (of the component failure rates)
d (x) and d , (x) such thatm m+1
p(x) = d (x)tm + d ^,(x)tm+1 + (terms of order tm+2 ) .v m m+1








(x)t* - I d (x)t
xeK xeK m x
m+1
+ (terms of order tm+2 )
,
m+1and R 2 (t) = J d (x)t
m
+ Y d ±1 (x)t
t, m L „ m+1xeK xeK
Thus we see that the problem of finding a second-order
approximation for the system hazard function can be solved by
finding a second-order approximation for p(x) for every cut
p(x) = d (x)tm + d
,
(x)tm+1 + (terms of order tm+2 )m m+1
= d (x)tm + d
,
(x)tm+1 .m m+1
(3) Under the assumptions that component failure rates
are constant and component lifetimes are independent we have
for any cut x:





n (1-e x )
i/0(x) ieO(x)





= n (1 - A . t = . . .)
i*0(x) i^O(x) 1
= 1 - t J X . + (terms of order t )
.
i*0(x) L




n (l-e 1 ) = IT (X .t - 1(X .t) 2 + . ..)
ieO(x) ieO(x) x 2 x
= n x t - k n \ .t) ( I x .t) + ...
ieO(x) 1 2~ ieO(x) ieO(x)
= t s n x . [i-i I x .t
ieO(x) x 2 ieO(x) x
2
+ (terms of order t )]
where s = the size of the cut x.
Multiplying these expansions of the products in p(x), we have:
p(x) = [1-t I X. + ...]»t s n X^l-lt I X- + ...]
i/0(x) 1 ieO(x) 2 ieO (x)
= t s n x-[i - a I x. + I x.)t
ieO(x) 2 ieO(x) i/0 (x)
2
+ (terms of order t )]
Thus, for any cut x size s we have
p(x) = d
s
(x)t s + d
s+1 (x)t
s+1
+ (terms of order ts+2 )
where d (x) =11 X •
icO(x)
and d_
+ 1 (x) =-n X. [1 £ X . + £ X].
ieO(x) 2 ieO(x) i^O(x) 1






+ (terms of order tm+2 )]
m+1 ,. ,





+ (terms of order t ^) ]
„_v m+1xeK
m+1








+ [ I dm+1 (x) + I dm+1 (x)]t
xeK xeK xeK ,,m m m+1
+ (terms of order tm+2 )
m+1
(4) As was shown in (2), the above expansion of £ p(x)
xeK
leads immediately to the second-order approximation for the
hazard function, i.e.,
R 2 (t) = J_ dm (x)t
m
.+ [_l_ dm+1 (x) + _l_ dm+1 (x)] t
m+1
where
xeK xeK xeK. tm m m+1
I d (x)t
m
= tm I n x.
xeK m xeK ieO (x) '
m m
£ dm+l (x) = J " n X i [1 I X i + I X
xeK x xeKm ieO(x) 7 ieO(x) igO(x)m
I dm+1 (x) = I n Xi
xeK
m+1 xeKm+l ie0(x)
This form of the second-order approximation has the follow-
ing properties:
a. Only cuts of size m and size m+1 need be considered.
b. The first term of the second-order approximation is





= R1 (t). •
xeKm
c. It is equivalent to the approximation that would result
from using the direct approach.
The following example illustrates the calculation of the
second-order approximation and points out a computational
shortcut.
Example 4-2. Calculate the second-order approximation for the
system described in Example 4-1.
(a) System width is m = 2.
(b) There is one cut of size 2: x 1 = (0,0,1,1).
So, K 2 = {x
1 }.








x 4 = (0,0,0,1)
.
So, K = {x 2 ,x 3 ,x 4 }.
(Note that x 2 is a minimal cut but x 3 and x 4 are not minimal
cuts . )




= d 2 (x-
l )t 2 = t 2 n x i = x xx 2 t
2
.








. We will carry out this
xeK
calculation in two parts:
J
- n X- [1 I X.]t 3 = -1X..A 9 (X + X )t
3
.






I - n X. [ I Ut 3 = - LLLt 3 - LLLt 3 .
xeK
2
ieO(x) ipfO(x) x ^ 4
(The latter pair of terms will be cancelled when we con-
sider the cuts in Km+i which are not minimal cuts.)




















(x 4 )t 3 = ^ 2* 3 t
3
•
(The last two terms will cancel terms from (e).)
(g) Sum the results of (d) , (e) , and (f) .
R2 (t) = X,X t 2 - 1X.X_(X ,+X )t 3 + Lli.t 3 .12 2" 121 2 134
In the foregoing example the terms -d^(x 3 )t and -d~(x )t 3
appear in the term d
3
(x 1 )t 3 . This is a consequence of the fact
that xl is contained in both x 3 and x , i.e., OCX-*-) is a
proper subset of both 0(x 3 ) and 0(x 4 ). We formalize this re-
sult in the following manner:
For each cut x of size m+1, let v(x ) be defined as the
number of cuts of size m which are contained in x . The term






will appear in [ dm+1 (x)t
m 1 with the coefficient
xeKT
-v(x*). Consequently, the term dm+ ^ (x*)
t
m+1 will appear in
R (t) with the coefficient l-v(x ), and this is true for each




R (t) = I dm (x)t
m
- 1 I d_(x) [ I X ] t
m+1
xeK 2 xeK ieO(x)m m





Thus, the second-order approximation for the system hazard
function can be calculated using the following method:
(a) Determine the system width m.
(b) Identify each cut of size m.
(c) For each cut of size m compute:
(1) dm (x) = n \ ± ,
ieO (x)
(2) I \ ± .ieO(x)
(d) Identify each minimal cut of size m+1, and compute




(e) Every non-minimal cut of size m+1 contains at least
one cut of size m, i.e., v(x)>.l. Identify those non-
minimal cuts of size m+1 which contain more than one cut
of size m, and compute (1-v (x) ) d + -, (x) for each of these.
(If we miss some terms here, the error is usually small and
always on the "safe side.")
(f
)
Use the terms calculated in (c) , (d) and (e) to
calculate R 2 (t)
.
The following example illustrates the method.
Example 4-3. In the system discussed in Example 4-1 place an-
other pump, No. 5, in series with No. 1. The resulting system
is shown in Fia. 5.
36





Figure 5. Pump System - Physical Arrangement.
The second-order approximation for the system hazard
function is calculated as follows:
(a) At least two pumps must fail in order for the sys-
tem to fail, so m = 2.
(b) The cuts of size 2 are:
(Nos. 1 and 2 have failed)x 1 - (0,0,1,1,1)
x (1,0,1,1,0) (Nos. 2 and 5 have failed)








(x ) = X 2^ c
* iie0(x )
= A + X
2
ie0(x 2 ) 5
(d) There are two minimal cuts of size m+1 = 3:
(Nos. 1, 3 and 4 have failed)x 3 = (0,1,0,0,1)
(Nos. 3, 4 and 5 have failed).x* = (1,1,0,0,0)









=S X 4X 5
(e) The cut x 5 = (0,0,1,1,0) contains both x 1 and x 2 ,
i.e., 0(x 1 ) = {1, 2}
0(x 2 ) = {2, 5}
and both of these are proper subsets of 0(x ) = {1, 2, 5}
So, v(x 5 ) = 2,
.
and (l-v(x 5 ) )d 3 (x
5






All other non-minimal cuts of size 3 contain only one cut
of size 2, i.e., l-v(x) = 0.
(f) Using the terms from (c)
,
(d) and (e) we have
R2 (t) = (x 1x 2 +x 2x 5 )t
2







+ ^A -I A -jA a +A —A «A j- —A ..A «A g- ) t .
The most difficult task in formulating the second-order
approximation is the identification of the non-minimal cuts
of size m+1 which contain more than one cut of size m. Aside
from this difficulty the second-order approximation is con-
ceptually no more difficult than the fix-up approximation.
Hand calculating the second-order approximation may be rela-
tively tedious. Whether increased accuracy is worth extra
effort is a difficult question in almost any context; we only
note that in many cases the error of the second-order approxi-
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